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Abstract 
Questions of data residence have taken on new 
significance in an era of cloud computing, when data 
can reside in any location, and indeed can reside in 
different locations at different times.  Microsoft and 
the Department of Justice are litigating over whether 
or not Microsoft is obligated to turn over data that 
does not reside in the US in response to a warrant 
from a US court.  The issues in the case have 
significance beyond the individual case, and require 
a comprehensive reexamination of data sovereignty 
and territoriality.  Moreover, this is a weak case, and 
the Department of Justice should not pursue it further 
for a variety of reasons. 
1. Introduction. 
The Federal Government and Microsoft are 
litigating over the government’s attempt to force 
Microsoft to disclose emails from an account whose 
owner has allegedly violated US law.  Although 
much information in the warrant has been redacted in 
the copies available online, it is clear that the case 
involves narcotics smuggling1.  On the surface, it 
seems like an ideal test case to establish the 
government’s right to access data from the Cloud, 
wherever in the world the data are stored.  The owner 
of the email account, if he is indeed a large-scale 
international drug dealer, is scarcely a figure that 
anyone would want to protect.  The emails may help 
convict the drug dealer if he is guilty, and he is 
certainly not a sympathetic figure.  But the case 
between Microsoft and the US Department of Justice 
is not about protecting the drug smuggler.  It is about 
data protection and data privacy laws, and indeed 
about due process and international law.  It is about 
furthering the development of a rational policy 																																																								
1 See Attachment C, page 41, of Government’s brief 
in Support of the Magistrate Judge’s Decision to 
Uphold a Warrant Ordering Microsoft to Disclose 
Records within its Custody and Control, Case 1:13-
mj-02814-UA Document 60, 
https://digitalconstitution.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/the-government-brief.pdf.  
towards data sovereignty and data citizenship in the 
cloud.  Protecting international agreements is far 
more important than providing access to these emails 
without due process, especially since there are easy 
ways to obtain the data legally. Furthering the 
development of policy for data sovereignty is more 
important than undermining it.2  This is quite simply 
the wrong case at the wrong time. 
The wrong case:  The case is quite complex, 
which is why it has been in the courts since 2013 [7].  
The alleged drug dealer is an Irish citizen.  Microsoft 
has stored the emails on a server located in Ireland 
for legitimate reasons relating to online 
performance.3  Microsoft is arguing that a US warrant 
does not, cannot, and indeed must not compel it to 
reveal data that are not located in the US and that do 
not belong to Microsoft but rather to a client [12].  
Microsoft is likewise arguing that the US needs to 
obtain an Irish warrant [12] to obtain data that reside 
in Ireland.  The US is arguing that they do not need to 
do so, and that this is burdensome and time 
consuming [11].  However, the Irish government has 
repeatedly offered to issue a warrant allowing the US 
to search Microsoft’s data in Ireland and has filed its 
own amicus curiae brief in support of Microsoft’s 
position [8].4  The US has chosen to delay the 																																																								
2 The significance of resolving issues in data 
sovereignty becomes clear when examining recent 
decisions and their implications for US high tech 
firms.  The recent EU decision striking down the safe 
harbor agreement between the EU and the US makes 
it illegal to transfer data from the EU to the US, 
threatening the business model of firms like Google 
and Facebook, among others [19], in part because 
there are no assurances that the US government 
cannot access the data.  The concern among US tech 
firms is obvious [4].    
3 Latency is reduced and overall response time is 
improved if an account is hosted as near to the 
account owner’s geographic location as practical. 
4 The full text of more than a dozen amicus curiae 
briefs can be found online at the following links, all 
available at https://digitalconstitution.com/about-the-
case/, 
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prosecution of the case by two and a half years by 
trying to force Microsoft to violate Irish sovereignty.  
This should thoroughly discredit the government’s 
argument concerning the need for speed.  There is a 
right way for the US to get the data it needs, and that 
is to rely upon Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs), whereby one government can request a 
warrant from a second country for evidence that is 
located in the second country.  See, for example, the 
text of the Second Circuit Court’s decision [13], 
noting both the role of MLATs and the presence of 
such an agreement between the US and Ireland.5 6  																																																																																			
Computer and Data Science Experts’ Amicus Brief 
(Filed December 15, 2014) 
Amazon and Accenture’s Amicus Brief (Filed 
December 15, 2014) 
Apple’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014) 
AT&T, Rackspace, Computer & Communications 
Industry Association, i2Coalition, and Application 
Developer’s Alliance’s Amicus Brief (Filed 
December 15, 2014) 
Brennan Center for Justice, ACLU, The Constitution 
Project and EFF’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 
2014) 
BSA | The Software Alliance, Center for Democracy 
and Technology, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 
The National Association of Manufacturers, and ACT 
| The App Association’s Amicus Brief (Filed 
December 15, 2014) 
Anthony J. Colangelo, International Law Scholar’s 
Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014) 
ABC, CNN, Forbes, Fox News, National Public 
Radio, The Guardian, The Washington Post and 23 
other media groups’ Amicus Brief (Filed December 
15, 2014) 
Verizon, Cisco, HP, eBay, Salesforce.com and 
Infor’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014) 
Digital Rights Ireland, Liberty and Open Rights 
Group’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 15, 2014) 
Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of European 
Parliament’s Amicus Brief (Filed December 19, 
2014) 
Government of Ireland’s Amicus Brief (Filed 
December 23, 2014)	5	That process is governed by a series of Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) between the 
United States and other countries, which allow 
signatory states to request one another’s assistance 
with ongoing criminal investigations, including 
issuance and execution of search warrants. See U.S. 
Dep’t of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 
962.1 (2013), available at 
fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM0960.html. 6	The United States has entered into an MLAT with 
all member states of the European Union, 
including Ireland. See Agreement on Mutual Legal 
Indeed, the Irish  
At the wrong time:  This is a complicated time 
for data privacy.  Wikileaks [18] and Edward 
Snowden’s disclosures of activities at the CIA [10] 
have made it clear the extent to which US 
information companies like Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, and Apple have cooperated in the past 
with US Federal investigations of US and foreign 
citizens, and there is a general sense of concern 
among American citizens about these systematic 
privacy violations [16], and disapproval of 
government surveillance even as part of counter 
terrorism activities [5, 17]. The resulting backlash has 
already made it difficult for the US to obtain the 
cooperation it needs; consider, for example, Apple’s 
refusal to cooperate with the FBI by unlocking the 
iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter [9].  
If there is a sense that US agencies do not respect 
international agreements and international privacy 
laws it will be increasingly difficult to get 
cooperation from foreign firms and foreign 
governments.   
As reported in the Wall Street Journal, The US 
Government sees this as a simple case [15]: 
The Justice Department, which is seeking the emails 
as part of a drug-trafficking investigation, sees no 
international conflict. Microsoft has control over the 
data from the U.S., where the company is based, and 
the company is subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
courts, the agency has argued in court and in legal 
briefs. At a time when governments around the world 
are cooperating and sharing data, this may initially 
appear attractive. 
The government sees this as a simple case 
because it sees it as a straightforward application of 
the 1986 Stored Communications Act, itself part of 
the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) [3].  Legal scholars agree on the centrality of 
the ECPA, but do not uniformly agree on the 
government’s interpretation of the Act; see, for 
example [7]. 
It is not a simple case.  Courts have been 
struggling for years on how to apply old laws to the 
issues created by modern technology (see for 
example [20]).  This case is even more complex 
because it involves international data sovereignty 
issues.  We will argue for a variety of reasons that 
this is the wrong case, at the wrong time for the US 
Department of Justice to use to establish its rights to 
data in the cloud, regardless of where the data are 
stored.  Rather than strengthen governments’ ability 
to access data in future cases, it may actually impede 
it. 																																																																																			
Assistance Between the European Union 
and the United States of America, June 25, 2003, 
T.I.A.S. No. 10‐201.1.	
4998
We will not argue as lawyers, though we will 
rely upon briefs filed in this case and legal 
precedents.  We will rather argue as technologists and 
strategy professionals, that is, as informed laymen. 
The structure of this short paper is as follows.  
Section 2 will outline the case itself.  Section 3 
reviews the status of the case and the decisions that 
have been reached to date.  Section 4 reviews why we 
believe the case should be decided in favor of 
Microsoft, and section 5 explains why we believe that 
the US Department of Justice should drop this case.  
Section 6 provides our policy recommendations 
regarding international requests for data in similar 
criminal cases, and section 7 provides our 
conclusions, our summary, and a terse review of our 
recommendations for future action. 
When we first wrote this paper for the 
conference we were arguing that the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals should decide in favor of Microsoft 
and against the Department of Justice.  Moreover, we 
were arguing that the Department of Justice should 
withdraw the case, rather than risk having the Circuit 
Court decide against them.  The Circuit Court did 
indeed decide in favor of Microsoft [24], agreeing on 
limits to the applicability of the ECPA to modern 
searches of the cloud [6].  We are now arguing that 
the Department of Justice should accept this decision 
and not seek cert, that is should not petition for a writ 
of certiorari and should not seek to have the case 
reviewed by the last remaining court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Moreover, we 
are now arguing that if the Department of Justice 
does seek cert, the Supreme Court should reject the 
petition and allow the Circuit Court’s ruling to stand.  
The arguments involved in this case are vitally 
important; indeed, they are too important to be 
resolved using such a weak case as this one to 
establish legal precedent. 
2. The arguments in the case  
The Department of Justice is seeking emails 
from a Hotmail account, and has served Microsoft 
with a search warrant demanding Microsoft produce 
the relevant emails to the Department of Justice.  
Microsoft has argued that since the data are not the 
property of Microsoft but of an Irish citizen, and 
since the data reside in Ireland, the warrant is not 
valid and has sought to have the warrant vacated 
[15].  Microsoft has sought to have the warrant 
vacated, that is ruled invalid.  Its attempts to do so 
have been unsuccessful, and currently Microsoft is 
being held in contempt of court for its refusal to 
comply. 
Microsoft’s legal arguments have three basic 
components.  First, Microsoft is arguing that there is 
no reason to believe that the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was written by 
Congress to have extraterritorial reach. Legislation of 
Congress is meant to only apply within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, to protect against 
international discord and preserve a stable 
background.  If Congress wanted to have 
extraterritorial reach, it needed to clearly state that in 
the legislation, and it has not done so in this case.7 8 9  
Moreover, Congress has historically wanted to 
maintain international norms:  US laws should be 
interpreted to avoid unreasonable interference with 
the sovereign authority of other nations10 in order to 
avoid  "international discord" that "could result" from 
"unintended clashes between our laws and those of 
other nations".11. 
Further, there is a presumption against 
extraterritorial application for a warrant12 13 14 15.  This 
presumption historically applies to cases involving 
the ECPA.16  
The Federal Government’s argument has three 
principal components.  First, Justice Francis accepted 
the argument that despite being called a warrant, the 
SCA warrant is actually part warrant and part 
subpoena [14].  An SCA warrant “is obtained like a 
search warrant when an application is made to a 
neutral magistrate who issues the order only upon a 
showing of probable cause” but then “is executed like 
a subpoena in that it is served on the ISP in 
possession of the information and does not involve 
government agents entering the premises of the ISP 
to search its servers and seize the email account in 
question”. 
Secondly, the test for the production of 
documents is control, not location17, and the US 																																																								
7 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010). 
8 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 
(1991). 
9 We will cite legal authorities in line, in the format 
that would be used in court documents and legal 
journals. 
10 Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v.  Empagran S.A, 2004 
WL 1300131 (2004). 
11 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 
1659 (2013), 
12 United States v. Vilar, No. S3 05–CR–621(KMK), 
(2007) 
13 United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
14 United States v. Aquino, No. 1:07cr428, (2008) 
15 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez  
494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
16 Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc.(2009) WL 4430297. 
17 In Re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova 
Scotia.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. 
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government has gotten documents despite criminal 
penalties under Swiss Law18,and enforced a grand 
jury subpoena for records stored in a foreign 
country.19 
Finally, the MLAT process may be slow and 
laborious, and certain countries don't have MLATs 
with the US.  The US should not therefore be 
required to rely upon MLATs when it can obtain a 
search warrant that allows it to access data held by a 
US company, whether or not the evidence in question 
is in the US, provided the US company can directly 
access that evidence from the US. 
Microsoft’s response has two components.  First, 
Microsoft asserts that it does not “own” the data, but 
instead serves as a custodian for the data.  It operates 
the equivalent of a password protected digital 
lockbox, and therefore fails the “possession, custody, 
or control regardless of the location” test.20 
Finally, the warrant served by the court on 
Microsoft from the Magistrate Judge is a warrant in 
every sense of the word.  In that respect, the warrant 
violates the Fourth Amendment because it does not 
identify the place to be searched and thus does not 
constitute a “reasonable” search.  Microsoft asserts 
that electronic text communication is analogous to 
letters and telephone conversations.  Like other forms 
of communication, emails have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and with a regular warrant, 
the US Government could not search every building 
of Microsoft in order to search for evidence.21 
3. Status of the case between Microsoft 
and the Department of Justice to date 
The Department of Justice has served Microsoft 
with a search warrant requiring that it turn over 
emails from a specific account, relevant to narcotics 
and international shipping.  Microsoft has sought to 
have the warrant vacated, that is, dismissed as 
invalid.  Microsoft lost its initial suit to have the 
warrant vacated in 2014, lost its initial appeal in 
2015, and appealed the case to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2015.  The Second Circuit issued 
its decision in July 2016, finding in favor of 
Microsoft.  Microsoft’s interpretation of the victory 
and of its significance are summarized in the blog 																																																																																			
the Bank of Nova Scotia, Defendant-appellant, 740 
F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984). 
18 Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
19 United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 584 
F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
20 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 - Supreme 
Court 2014 
21 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th 
Cir. 2010)	
written by their President and Chief Legal Officer 
Brad Smith, immediately after the decision was 
announced [21]. 
4. Factors that might argue for the 
Department of Justice violating 
territoriality 
There are extraordinary conditions under which 
the Department of Justice might indeed need to 
violate territoriality and attempt to force a company 
to provide data that resides in a foreign nation.  
Arguing as a technologist and a “reasonable man22 
each of us believes that the following can constitute 
valid reasons for violating jurisdictions and territorial 
restrictions. 
• Hot pursuit — When authorities are in hot 
pursuit of suspects, and there is a danger that 
the suspects will escape or destroy evidence if 
not apprehend.  Police chasing robbery 
suspects will now coordinate across 
jurisdictions but will not routinely allow 
suspects to escape if they succeed in crossing a 
municipal, county, or state border.  This 
argument is based largely on the need for 
speed. 
• Clear and present danger — When authorities 
believe that the evidence is needed 
immediately to prevent a major catastrophe, 
involving significant property damage or loss 
of life.  If authorities believe that coordinating 
with appropriate counter-parties in separate 
jurisdictions may result in a dangerous delay, 
allowing suspects to commit further criminal 
acts, taking actions that violate 
extraterritoriality may be justified. 
• Unresponsive or uncooperative foreign 
counter-parties — When authorities believe 
that evidence or suspects have been located in 
foreign jurisdictions where cooperation will be 
withheld, or where authorities believe that 
their foreign counterparties will actively 
participate sheltering fugitives or in the 
destruction of evidence, violating territorial 
boundaries may be justified. 																																																								
22 See Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasonable_person, “In 
law, a reasonable person (historically reasonable 
man) or the man on the Clapham omnibus is a 
hypothetical person of legal fiction whose is 
ultimately an anthropomorphic representation of the 
body care standards crafted by the courts and 
communicated through case law and jury 
instructions.”  That is, we are attempting to examine 
the case as reasonable individuals, not as legal 
experts. 
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Indeed, all three have historically been used to 
ignore territorial boundaries in cases in the past. 
• Hot pursuit — The doctrine of hot pursuit 
allows competent authorities to pursue 
suspects if there is a clear reason to believe 
that they have committed an offense and if 
there is a clear reason to believe that they will 
escape if not pursued.  The applicability of the 
hot pursuit doctrine internationally is 
extremely limited, and it applies in only two 
areas.  Its principal use is the pursuit of a 
vessel that is believed to have committed an 
offense within the territorial waters of a nation, 
when that vessel has escaped into international 
waters while being pursued by competent 
authorities of the nation whose territorial 
boundaries have been violated.  The second 
area of applicability is within the Schengen 
Area of Europe, including 22 of the 26 
member states of the European Union. 
• Clear and present danger — The US chose to 
send a special operations Seal Team after Bin 
Laden without the delay that would have 
resulted from attempting to cooperate with 
Pakistani authorities.  Bin Laden was 
considered too dangerous to the US for him to 
be allowed to remain at large and potentially 
active.  
• Unresponsive or uncooperative counter-
parties — The Israeli government’s abducting 
Eichmann, who was sheltering in Argentina 
can be viewed as ignoring the territorial rights 
of a sovereign nation [1].  US actions against 
Marc Rich when he was exploiting Swiss 
banking secrecy laws can be viewed as a 
similar but less dramatic example of the same 
principle.  There was also a danger that 
attempting to coordinate with Pakistani 
authorities when the US acted against Bin 
Laden in Pakistan would have been impossible 
because there was a clear danger that Bin 
Laden would have been alerted and given time 
to flee [2].  Interestingly, the analysis of these 
cases after actions were completed suggests 
that the use of the principle of 
extraterritoriality can be contentious, even in 
cases that may initially appear to be 
unambiguously legal. 
We believe that it is clear that none of the three 
is relevant in this case. 
• Hot pursuit — The case is two and a half 
years old. The emails have been archived.  
There is no time pressure that would justify 
extraterritoriality.  And it is hard to see how 
international agreements on extraterritoriality 
would support the position of the US 
Department of Justice. 
• Clear and present danger — After two and a 
half years presumably the suspect is in custody 
somewhere.  Presumably he is not going 
anywhere or harming anyone, and presumably 
he is no longer engaged in international drug 
smuggling.  And the US government must 
agree that there is no immediate danger or they 
would not have refused offers of cooperation 
from the Irish government, which would have 
allowed resolution of the cases months earlier. 
• Unresponsive or uncooperative counter-
parties — Far from being unresponsive or 
uncooperative, the Irish authorities have 
volunteered to provide a warrant that would 
have allowed the Department of Justice to 
access the relevant emails.  These offers of 
cooperation to date have all been refused by 
the US Department of Justice, but surely one 
cannot argue that the Irish authorities have 
been unresponsive or uncooperative, or that 
they have behaved in any way that would 
justify violation of their territoriality. 
5. Why this case should have been 
decided in favor of Microsoft 
We believe that the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided correctly when it ruled in favor of 
Microsoft.  The case brought by the Department of 
Justice was not a strong one.  Moreover, the interests 
of numerous parties with an interest in the case were 
best served by this decision.  As we explore below, 
these parties range from US citizens, US technology 
companies, and customers of those companies, to the 
US government itself. 
The case brought by the Department of Justice 
was not a strong one.  The cases that the US 
government uses, and upon which its arguments rely, 
are old and did not involve electronic evidence.  
Extending the FBI’s reach to electronic data 
wherever in the world it resides as long as it is 
administered by an American data services company 
is too great a reach.  It is unjustified.  And it is 
unnecessary.  It is easy enough for US authorities to 
request that the American data services company 
archive data so that there is little or no danger of the 
data being destroyed.  After that, there is adequate 
time for US authorities to rely upon MLATs, and to 
request that a search warrant be issued in the 
appropriate jurisdiction. 
The interests of US citizens around the world 
would be harmed if this case were decided in favor of 
the US government.  At present, corporations insist, 
rightly, that foreign governments must obtain valid 
search warrants issued in the jurisdiction in which 
data resides before they can be forced to share data 
on their customers with foreign governments.  If this 
case were decided in favor of the US and against 
Microsoft, this would establish a precedent that 
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would enable any foreign government to obtain any 
data from any company that operated in that 
country’s territory, regardless of where that data 
resided.  US citizens would no longer have any legal 
protection against illegal search and seizure of their 
data, using precedents established by the US 
government.  This could be extremely dangerous to 
citizens traveling abroad, to nations with less 
established legal protections than our own. 
The interests of Microsoft customers around the 
world would likewise be harmed if this case were 
decided in favor of the US government.  At present, 
Microsoft insists, rightly, that any government must 
obtain valid search warrants issued in the jurisdiction 
in which data resides before they can be forced to 
share data on their customers with foreign 
governments.  If this case were decided in favor of 
the US and against Microsoft, this would establish a 
precedent that would enable place any Microsoft 
customer at risk of unreasonable search and seizure 
of their data by the US, without the legal protections 
offered by their home jurisdiction. 
The interests of US corporations would also be 
harmed if this case were decided in favor of the US 
government.  At present, US corporations insist, 
rightly, that foreign governments must obtain valid 
search warrants issued in the jurisdiction in which 
data resides before they can be forced to share data 
on their customers with foreign governments.  If this 
case were decided in favor of the US and against 
Microsoft, this would establish a precedent that 
would enable the US to obtain data belonging to any 
customer of a US data services company, regardless 
of the customer’s home jurisdiction, and regardless of 
where in the world the data resided.  Customers 
would rationally seek and find alternative service 
providers, damaging or even destroying one of the 
US’s most innovative international market for 
services.  Not surprisingly, a large number of 
technology and media companies have submitted 
amicus curiae briefs in support of Microsoft’s 
position [23]. 
Even the interests of the US Government would 
be harmed by a decision against Microsoft.  
Voluntary data sharing and cooperation among 
government agencies is increasingly important, and 
the US is increasingly arguing for the rule of law and 
for coordination of activities among intelligence 
services and cooperation in the global fight against 
terrorism.  If the US wants other countries to respect 
laws and common practices around the world, it must 
do so itself.  If the US wants other countries to share 
data and intelligence information with it, it must 
respect data privacy laws of the nations with which it 
is cooperating. 
6. The US government should withdraw 
this case rather than risk losing it 
We argued in advance of the Second Circuit 
Court’s ruling that the case was weak, and that the 
US was likely to lose it.  This was indeed shown to 
be correct.  This remains true now.  The case remains 
weak, and the US remains likely to lose should it 
seek to pursue the case further by appealing to the US 
Supreme Court. 
Moreover, it is easy to imagine future situations 
in which the Department of Justice truly might need 
to force a corporation to perform a search abroad, for 
example in a case involving data resident in a country 
with which the US did not have an MLAT in place.  
Losing this case would set a damaging precedent that 
would make it more difficult for the US to argue 
successfully for extraterritoriality in the future.  Not 
only is the government risking setting a damaging 
precedent, it is doing so with a weak case, and with 
case that it does not need to pursue; the Irish 
Government has repeatedly offered to cooperate. 
7. What we recommend as policy 
There is a small set of actions that could easily 
be taken by all technology services companies and 
email providers.  These actions would ensure that the 
outcome of a case would not be determined by delay 
caused by properly pursuing appropriate venues, 
simply by preserving potentially relevant evidence 
while warrants were pursued.  Thus, no country 
would ever need to argue that in the absence of rapid 
search, including search of questionable legality, 
necessary email evidence would be lost forever.  
While this would not alter the need for speed in 
counter-terrorism operations, it would essentially 
nullify the arguments used by the Department of 
Justice in this case.  The Congress should pass 
legislation that would make these actions mandatory 
for all service providers operating in the United 
States. 
First, all email service providers around the 
world should be required to maintain backups of all 
email correspondence as soon as they receive a 
suitable official notification of an investigation 
anywhere in the world for which this email is 
material evidence and an official request for 
assistance in obtaining a valid search warrant.  We 
are aware that backups are usually available, but this 
ensures that any email that was available at the time 
of notification would always remain available at the 
time the service provider received a valid warrant.  
This does not require the service providers to respond 
to a warrant from a foreign jurisdiction.  It does 
require the service provider to maintain and protect 
archival data until such time as the case is resolved or 
the relevant jurisdiction where the data resides has 
issued a warrant.  If such a valid warrant is issued, 
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then and only then is the company is required to 
provide the data covered by the warrant.  An official 
request would be from a state, provincial, or national 
government, or from an organization such as Interpol.  
Rows (1) and (2) of table 1 below summarize the 
activities that would be required of all service 
providers providing email services within the United 
States, whether they are US-based corporations or 
not. 
We note that it could easily be impossible to 
enforce this without international harmonization.  A 
service provider operating out of the mythical Duchy 
of Grand Fenwick or the Republic of Illyria might 
seek to gain competitive advantage by persuading 
their governments not to require archiving of email 
accounts.  We therefore believe that international 
harmonization would be critical here.  Companies 
that were not required to archive email when notified 
of its relevance to litigation might enjoy a 
competitive advantage.  Companies that could be 
forced to provide emails without a valid warrant 
would likewise be at a competitive disadvantage.  
While the US Congress cannot impose requirements 
or operating policies on companies when they 
provide email services outside the US, we believe 
that rows (3) through (5) represent policies that the 
US should seek to have implemented by trading 
partners around the world. 
We believe that all governments should rely 
upon MLATs to obtain valid search warrants when 
they seeks data maintained by email service 
providers, regardless of the home country of the 
service provider and regardless of the location of the 
data requested. 
However, no service provider offering services 
within the United States should be able to evade their 
legal obligations to respond to valid warrants relevant 
to US investigations by locating their servers off-
shore.  This would preclude both the obvious 
possibility of locating their servers in countries with 
which the US does not have MLATs, or the possibly 
more contrived alternative of constructing artificial 
islands not subject to any nation’s laws and not 
responsive to any nation’s MLAT.  Indeed, we 
recommend that either of these actions should be 
interpreted under US law as a deliberate attempt to 
evade control over data when required for criminal 
cases.  These off-shore legal evasions should be 
viewed as only slightly different from illegal off-
shore money laundering and other illegal financial 
transactions.  In these instances US courts should be 
permitted to search data as if it were maintained in 
the US, because its foreign location would have no 
other explanation except to avoid reasonable search.  
Obviously, the US can only impose these restrictions 
on companies operating in the United States and 
offering services within the US.  However, for 
obvious reasons, the US should encourage 
international harmonization, so that all our trading 
partners impose comparable restrictions on service 
providers offering services within their borders.  This 
is described in rows (6) and (7) in the table below. 
Regrettably, obvious loopholes exist.  
Individuals with private email servers can agree 
amongst themselves to perform no archiving and 
retain no copies of messages.  New email service 
providers can locate in unregulated markets and offer 
email services that retain no archives and thus are not 
subject to search, even if offering such service were 
to violate local laws and regulations.  End-to-end 
encryption is emerging as a problem for law 
enforcement around the world.   While most 
encryption is in principle subject to decryption with 
sufficient time and sufficient resources, most criminal 
investigations do not justify unlimited expenditure on 
decryption, and in the case of terrorist threats there is 
generally insufficient time for brute-force decryption.   
Country 
Where 
Court 
Located 
Country 
Where 
Data 
Stored  
Relevant 
MLAT 
in Force 
Warrant 
that is 
Required 
Note 
US US —— 
US 
(Country 
of Court 
and 
Data) 
(1) 
US Non-US YES 
Country 
of Data 
via 
MLAT 
(2) 
US Non-US NO 
US in 
the 
Absence 
of 
MLAT 
(3) 
Non-
US 
Same 
Non-US —— 
Country 
of Court 
and Data 
(4) 
Non-
US 
Different 
Non-US YES 
Country 
of Data 
via 
MLAT 
(5) 
Non-
US US YES US (6) 
Non-
US US NO 
Country 
of Court 
in the 
Absence 
of 
MLAT 
(7) 
Table 1.—Recommended policies for the applicability 
of search warrants internationally. 
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8. Conclusions:  Summary and 
Recommendations for Future Action 
Our analysis supports the following assessment 
of the case: 
• The US Government can already obtain the 
data it seeks; this litigation is unnecessary. 
• The US Government’s arguments are weak or 
even inapplicable in an online environment, 
and if the case is ultimately decided in the 
courts the US should lose. 
• The US Government should withdraw this 
case rather than risk losing it and risk setting 
an unfortunate precedent. 
The case is potentially harmful to the interests of 
US citizens, Microsoft and other US service 
providers, and even the US Government itself.  If the 
US Government were to win this case, despite the 
weakness of its arguments, the interests of several 
groups would be adversely affected. 
• US citizens using any data service provider 
anywhere in the world would be at risk of 
unreasonable search and seizure of their 
electronic communications as foreign 
governments use this case as a precedent to 
force cooperation with their own search 
warrants.  US Citizens’ protections would be 
limited to those of any country that wanted any 
data, rather than those available under US law. 
• US Corporations including Microsoft would 
be at risk of losing credibility with their 
customers, since it would appear that the US 
Government could search their electronic 
records in foreign jurisdictions without 
complying with the laws of those jurisdictions. 
• Even the US Government, at a time when 
voluntary data sharing and cooperation is 
increasingly important, and the US is 
increasingly arguing for the rule of law, may 
find its own long-term interests harmed if it 
were to appeal to the US Supreme Court and 
then to win this case on appeal. 
For these reasons as well, the US Government 
should withdraw this case. 
The US Congress should draft appropriate 
legislation that would require US corporations to 
maintain backup storage of critical electronic 
communications involved in litigation, but should not 
require them to turn over their records until they have 
received a valid search warrant for the jurisdiction in 
which the data resides.  Moreover, existing mutual 
legal assistance treaties should be extended so that 
service providers in foreign jurisdictions obey 
harmonized codes. 
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